AFAC POSITION PAPER 02/2007

Background

• Considerable focus has been placed on increased recruitment of personnel for augmenting the size of the Canadian Forces. This is in direct response to the stated Government priority of expanding from 62,000 to 75,000 Regular Force members and from 25,000 to 35,000 Reservists. Commendable effort has been made to increase numbers, but the absorption rate of new personnel is limited by the ability to properly train recruits and place them in effective operational positions.
• The operational demands on the CF have impeded its ability to dedicate experienced personnel in sufficient numbers to this training effort. Significant effort has been made to outsource some training, especially the more common introductory courses where access to serving military instructors is not critical. Much of the more advanced and demanding training must be done by the military, however, and the sheer number of recruits over the past several years have stressed the training system to it limits.
• Although the most visible pressure may apply to the army, shortages in the air force cause significant concern. The availability of pilots, for example, is expected to become more acute. There is evidence that the demand for commercial pilots is increasing, just at a time when the health of the pilot occupation remains vulnerable. The airline industry is not only fully recovered after 9/11 but is in a growth mode, with passenger traffic expected to increase at an average annual rate of 4%. The demand for trained personnel will be aggravated by “boomer” generation retirements. In the US, 25,000 pilots will leave over the next 12 years, while India and China alone require 140,000 pilots in the decade beginning in 2002.
• In addition to aircrew and technicians, Engineers, project managers, logistics officers and others will be needed, at a time of aviation industry rejuvenation. Furthermore, demands for a trained and disciplined work force will be exacerbated as new fleets are introduced into the inventory. The acquisition of more uninhabited aerial vehicles will only increase the pressure.
• The number of pilots is currently about 6% below the preferred manning level. Figures for AVN, AVS and ACS 500-series technicians are 10%, 10%, and 3% respectively. The Aircraft Technician Transformation initiative is well underway and producing results, but it will still take some five years for the AVN and AVS trades to return to health.

AFAC Position

• While maintaining a healthy level of recruitment is important to the long term future of the CF, some of the short term needs can be addressed through a proactive effort towards better retention. The investment made in training and developing any military member into an effective sailor, soldier, or airman/woman can be very extensive and should be protected to the extent practical. Those who have acquired the necessary skills, independently or in military service, should be motivated to remain in the military. There are several ways of accomplishing this, a few of which are listed:
  • Ensure flexibility in service by allowing broken service without penalty, seamless transfer from regular to reserve (including the Supplementary Reserve) and vice versa, and policies which consider personal preferences to a greater degree
  • Encourage those with desired skills who wish to re-enroll after leaving the military, focusing on a quick and easy process to do so, and employing them to the best advantage
  • Offer flexibility in career options after an initial period of service
  • Expand the medical release policy, with a view to greater accommodation of those who might not meet the full physical requirements, especially if this is related to prior service or if they have badly needed qualifications
  • Put in place an responsive policy to deal with shortages, through measures such as retention bonuses and adjustments to terms of service for any stressed occupations, before the such situations become crises
  • Maintenance of attractive pay, benefits, and health care services and continued attention to the needs of families
  • Better pay and benefits for reservists
  • Encourage a stronger sense of ‘family’ among military members, to enhance the sense of bonding and comradeship that is so important to dedication and service to country
  • Continue to focus on the importance and meaningfulness of the roles performed, the need for appropriate equipment to perform them, and the commensurate operating budgets
• Of even more significance than these measures is the need for the current generation of CF personnel to have some control over their career and lives. The transformation of ‘employment’ practices to a two-way dialogue with individuals, catering to their personal priorities to the extent practicable and considering their careers more holistically, offers the potential of better overall personnel managed readiness in the long term.

Messages

• Recruiting and retention initiatives need to be maintained in a healthy balance in order to serve the short and long term needs of the air force. Every effort should be made to protect the investment made in the skills of CF personnel.
• Initiatives to increase retention and attract back to the air force individuals with the necessary qualifications should be pursued aggressively. The AFAC applauds the effort being made in this area and encourages continued application to meet the challenges of the future.
• Transforming the management of personnel readiness to one of greater flexibility and understanding of individual goals and priorities offers the potential for dramatic long term benefits for retention.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee
Point of Contact: Don McLeod, donwmcleod@ns.sympatico.ca, 902-427-7151
Date: April 2007

AFAC POSITION PAPER 01/2007

Background

• The Snowbirds have been an icon of the Canadian Forces since 1971 and perpetuate a long tradition of air demonstration teams in Canada. The nine-plane precision formation team, with its red and white Tutor aircraft, is a familiar sight to almost all Canadians and enjoys an exceptional level of recognition by everyone. Last summer the team members were recognized as guests of the Prime Minister in Parliament. Commemorative stamps and coins celebrating the 35th Anniversary of the Snowbirds were issued during the same period.
• The Tutor aircraft was built in Canada and served as a pilot trainer from 1964 to 2000. The aging aircraft was replaced through the transition to the NATO Flying Training in Canada program. The remaining Tutor fleet is now dedicated to support the Snowbirds. With continued maintenance and some upgrades to exploit newer technologies, it could last until about 2020.
• The skill and precision of the demonstration team are impressive, but the aircraft does not represent a current CF fleet. While this may not make much of a difference to many members of the general public, it is a departure from past teams which have been composed of operational (to include training) aircraft and which could be represented as such. Operating an ‘orphan’ fleet presents also some problems. In addition to having to qualify pilots in a ‘new’ aircraft, there are potential support issues in operating the small, aging and unique Tutor fleet.

AFAC Position

• The Snowbirds are an important feature of public awareness of the Canadian Forces. They are a world-class demonstration team that represents the air force and the CF admirably in Canada and abroad. In addition to their flying displays, the team members are recognized for the many events in which they participate and the positive image they portray of the military in Canada. Moreover, they represent an important contribution to the recruitment efforts of the CF and contribute to the preservation of a ceremonial role in the military.
• While the Tutor has proven to be a very capable aircraft, it no longer represents the aircraft flown by the air force. Also, it is more than 40 years old and must be updated to ensure that it can continue to operate successfully beyond 2010. Even with this additional investment and careful management of the fatigue life of the reserve of aircraft, consideration should be given to the need to replace the fleet.
• It would make the most sense to employ a demonstration aircraft that is representative of the operational air force. Moreover, to maintain the effect of the demonstration, it is considered important that the aircraft be propelled by a jet-, as opposed to a turboprop-engine.
• While it is recognized that DND will continue to provide pilots and some ground crew for the Snowbirds, there is no compelling need for the department to purchase the aircraft outright or to provide all of the maintenance and support required. If a lease-of-aircraft and a contracted-maintenance arrangement is felt to be advantageous, it should be considered, recognizing that uniformed ground crew have been an important element of the team since its beginning.
• More importantly, the funding to provide the fleet should not have to compete with other military requirements. With limited resources, DND has difficulty assigning a high priority to a Snowbird replacement when there are so many needs related to operational combat capabilities. The Government should provide funding over and above the DND budget for this purpose, which is, after all, more of a nation-building initiative than a military capability.

Messages

• The Snowbirds are valuable ambassadors of the Canadian Forces and a recognized national icon. Consideration needs to be given to a new aircraft if they are going to be able to continue over the longer term.
• The Government should commit to the continuation of the Team through the acquisition of a new aircraft to replace the aging Tutors. The replacement aircraft should be representative of a fleet currently in service.
• Funding for this initiative should be provided over and above the current and projected Defence budget, so as not to compete for resources with those needed for the combat capabilities of the CF.
  Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee

Point of Contact: Don McLeod, donwmcleod@ns.sympatico.ca, 902-427-7151
Date: February 2007

AFAC POSITION PAPER 06/2006

Background

• Over the past few decades the United States has spent a huge amount of research and development dollars towards a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Moreover, in 1999 the US Government enacted legislation to field a system as soon as the technology became available to do so. As the reality of a viable capability neared, Canada and the US began discussions about the possibility of Canadian participation in the system as a part of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) partnership.
• Canadian representatives began in 2002 to pursue discussions with a view to reaching a positive decision on participation. Still lacking resolution of this and realizing the immanency of an initial operating capability, in August of 2004, the NORAD Agreement was amended to ensure that ballistic missile warning information provided by NORAD would continue to be a NORAD responsibility even though it would be used for BMD purposes. Such an amendment was needed to ensure that Canadians could maintain involvement in a traditional NORAD role.
• Despite positive signals that Canada would likely join the US in providing BMD for the continent, the Government announced in February of 2005 that it had chosen not to participate. This was a surprise to many, although the majority of Canadians appeared to support the Government’s decision, as arguments against BMD were many and were not effectively refuted. Some of the points made were as follows, along with a clarifying statement or counterpoint.
  • BMD won’t work – In reality, there were testing failures, but there were also successes, as there are in any complex development program.
  • BMD will precipitate nuclear proliferation – Unfortunately, nuclear proliferation is a reality — the issue is how to deal with it. In providing a defence against the so-called ‘rogue nation’ with a few weapons, BMD will help to mitigate the threat from proliferation. It would be stabilizing overall.
  • Deployment will lead to weapons in space – This is possible, but the system is not so designed. As a participant, Canada might have had some influence on issues related to the deployment of space-based weapons.
  • The system is too expensive, and a waste of money – Perhaps, but the US is funding it entirely.
  • There is no threat – And yet recent events in North Korea and Iran have demonstrated a continued commitment by those countries to develop nuclear weapons and a means to deliver them intercontinentally.
  • We don’t want missiles on Canadian soil – This was never part of the plan.
  • We don’t want nuclear fallout over Canada – While no nuclear weapons are used in BMD, there is a minimal risk of debris from an engagement falling on Canadian territory. For the most part, this would be burned up in the atmosphere.
• BMD is destabilizing by giving the US too much power – But it is better to defend against a small attack, rather than simply resorting to retaliation as a nuclear deterrent.
  •The failure to accept BMD as a NORAD mission has diminished the importance of the alliance to the Americans and the role that Canadian military members play in integrated operations. As time passes, the relevance of NORAD is being questioned more and more, especially with the formation of Northern Command in Colorado Springs and the priority being assigned to it.

AFAC Position

• NORAD has provided the means to detect, warn against, intercept and engage, if necessary, threats which penetrate continental airspace. That is, NORAD can detect and mount a modest defence against the traditional bomber or cruise missile threat. When it comes to ballistic missiles, however, NORAD’s capability has been limited to detecting and providing warning of an attack. It would be a logical extension of the NORAD mission to defend against this aerospace threat.
• Those who argue against BMD have not presented a case that stands up to a logical debate on the issue. If anything, detractors cite that Canada should not participate because it is a priority of the Bush Administration, even though President Clinton was in power when the legislation was passed.
• The Conservative Government has indicated a willingness to re-consider Canadian participation, and should be encouraged to do so. It has been stated, however, that this could be triggered by a request from the US for Canada to participate. Given the history of the discussions (which were initiated by Canada in the first instance), the unexpected announcement not to participate, and the fact that the US has proceeded independently to ‘operationalize’ the system, there is little chance that the US will make any request. Canada must take the initiative.
• The future of NORAD has been compromised by the BMD decision and Canada should take the initiative to address this situation if we wish to continue to benefit from this most unique partnership with the US.
  Messages
• The decision not to participate in BMD was not fully thought through. Notwithstanding the public support of the decision, logical examination of the issue demonstrates that it is in Canada’s interest to be involved in a security issue which affects the continent.
• Canada’s position in NORAD is atrophying, in large part due to the decision not to participate in BMD. Canada benefits significantly from an effective NORAD partnership, and should do everything to assure the well-being of a continuing partnership.
• The Government should reopen the BMD issue. Canada should take the initiative by requesting to open negotiations on participation. This should probably be done by the Prime Minister of Canada directly with the President of the United States.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee
Point of Contact:
Dean Black, director@airforce.ca, 613-232-4281
Date: December 2006

• Date: 11 Dec 06

  Background

  • • There is no substitute, now or in the foreseeable future, for manned fighter aircraft, which have played an important role in the capabilities of the Canadian Forces. They have enabled air defence of Canadian airspace through partnership with the United States in NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command). As a deterrent during the Cold War, Canadian fighters were based in relatively large numbers in Europe with an ability to project force. They participated actively in the first Gulf campaign. Later in the 1990s, they were deployed to Aviano in Italy in conjunction with the Kosovo air-to-ground and air-to-air campaign. Since September 11, 2001 the need for air power to counter the potential terrorist threat has increased the importance for fighter protection of Canadian interests. Although it is taken for granted by many, the NORAD commitment continues to be an enduring role for the CF18 in the defence of Canada. Additionally, the need for air support to expeditionary operations continues, as witnessed by the current NATO mission in Afghanistan. This air support has been provided to Canadian troops by our NATO partners to date.
      

• Canada will continue to need a fighter fleet for the foreseeable future. They are important to the defence of our vast country, a role which has taken on new importance since 9/11. They are our only means of projecting air power abroad and have done so effectively in the past.
  
• The investment being made to update and extend the CF18 fleet is needed and appropriate. Continuing commitment is needed to ensure that the aircraft is equipped with the necessary capabilities and appropriate weapons.
  
• The Canadian Government should give serious consideration to deploying CF18s to provide support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. This would reinforce Canada’s commitment to the mission and would provide an alternative to the deployment of other forces. Furthermore, it would provide an opportunity to effectively employ joint forces in a challenging environment where effective integration of operations is critical.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee







Contacts: George Macdonald,







gmacdonald@cfncon.com , (613) 232-1576

AFAC POSITION PAPER 04/2006

Background

• Current fixed-wing search and rescue (FWSAR) is done by Buffalo aircraft and seven to ten Hercules, providing an excellent mix of relatively fast, long-range response (Hercules) and sufficient maneuverability required for mountainous operations along the West Coast (Buffalo). The Buffalo is well beyond its initially-projected service life and, while effective, the Hercules is more aircraft than is needed for the role and is expensive to support.
• This capability needs to be replaced. The major considerations should be to ensure that the replacement capability provides at least an equivalent search and rescue service. This is not only important to Canadians but is a requirement to meet Canada’s obligations as a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization to provide SAR services in our area of responsibility.
• There are a number of critical operational and performance requirements for any replacement FWSAR aircraft:
  • Fast response – The aircraft must be able to provide “same day” search throughout the extensive Canadian area of responsibility. The faster the aircraft, the better the potential response, be it at the outer extent of the area, or to a time-critical rescue at relatively closer range (e.g. survivors of a shipping accident suffering hypothermia off the coast of Newfoundland).
  • Adequate search capability in varied terrain – While maneuverability is fundamental, cockpit field of view to operate safely is also critical. Pilots must be able to see ahead along the aircraft’s flight path through overhead windows while executing a turn, especially in mountainous terrain.
  • Adequate cabin size and access – In addition to being able to accommodate the necessary palletized search and rescue equipment, the cabin must be large enough for rescue personnel to move around, safely don their personal gear, and parachute from the aircraft.
• Extensive operational research has confirmed that the current basing of FWSAR aircraft is optimal to respond quickly to the vast majority of incidents, which occur on the coasts and along the Great Lakes. The low historical frequency of incidents in the North or at other extreme distances may not warrant permanent forward basing of valuable assets, but does not diminish the need to be able to respond to incidents in these remote areas.
• Overall, the national intent is to replace the current SAR capability with an equal or better response, in the interest of saving as many lives as practical.
• Notwithstanding the fact that the project was initiated in 2003 and announced in the Liberal budget of 2004, with an extraordinary allocation of $1.3 billion, no substantive progress has been made towards acquisition. Other priorities, which were announced at the end of June, have overtaken the FWSAR project.

AFAC Position

• Acquisition of a FWSAR aircraft makes good operational and economic sense. It would permit the retirement of the long-serving Buffalo fleet and offload pressure from the Hercules fleet. A new aircraft which is capable of meeting the mandatory requirements will significantly improve SAR capability for the longer term and will result in a more cost-effective arrangement. Importantly, more Hercules aircraft, which are more suited for the tactical transport role, will be available for deployed support operations. Their employment for SAR in the future would then be in a secondary role, as is the case for other CF aircraft
• The inability of the Government to progress acquisition of a new fleet is disappointing. Now that several higher priority and more operational fleet requirements have been addressed, swift action should now be taken to approve the FWSAR project and issue the documentation to identify qualified bidders and to solicit proposals, ultimately leading to a contract.
• Acquisition of a new FWSAR aircraft will precipitate significant benefits to Canadian industry in the form of direct and indirect benefits, and decades of support work for the new fleet.

Messages

The Government should proceed with the acquisition of a FWSAR aircraft as soon as practicable. Funds have been earmarked to do just this; the current assets are badly in need of replacement; and the capability will enhance the safety of all Canadians.

The traditional employment of the Hercules in SAR, while operationally effective, is not cost effective when more operationally-suitable alternatives are available. Introduction of a dedicated FWSAR fleet will enable Hercules aircraft to be redirected more to what they do best – tactical transport.

The operational requirements established for the FWSAR aircraft are valid, reasonable and must be fully satisfied by the aircraft procured, so as to ensure that SAR service to Canadians remains at the current level or higher in the future.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee

Points of Contact:
George Macdonald, gmacdonald@cfccon.com, (613) 232-1576
Marc Terreau, terreau@sympatico.ca, (613) 837-8746

SEE THE SENATE COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE

AFAC POSITION PAPER 03/2006

• Recent announcements of projected equipment acquisitions and plans for the CF are most welcomed and will enable valuable increased mobility. There are other areas, however, where looming deficiencies in our future defence capabilities must also be addressed. One of these is our decreasing ability to survey and protect our coastlines, ocean approaches and Northern regions.
  
• Time and distance requirements have long dictated that this task is most efficiently carried out from the air. The CP140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft on both coasts that have conducted anti-submarine warfare, fisheries patrol, support to covert drug ops and general surveillance duties over ocean areas and sea lines of communication have become aged and outdated like much of the CF inventory. Fortunately, the entire fleet of 18 aircraft is currently undergoing a major upgrade to their internal avionics through the Aurora Incremental Modernization Program (AIMP), but it is also rapidly in need of critical airframe upgrades and maintenance work.
• The end of the Cold War, combined with a concomitant reduction in resources to the CF as a whole, influenced decision-makers to assign lower priorities to the maritime patrol fleet. Flying rates have declined; unique skills have atrophied; and availability of aircraft has been exacerbated by the avionics upgrade program. This has resulted in overall diminished operational effectiveness, although there continues to be a high demand to employ aircraft, not just domestically but on deployed operations as well.
  
• The Aurora Service Life Extension Program (ASLEP) was initiated to address the structural upgrades needed to extend the life of the airframe to as long as 2025. Given the high investment in the avionics of the aircraft, it is only logical to ensure that the aircraft itself has sufficient structural life to exploit the new systems.
• Unfortunately, the commitment to ASLEP has wavered. Suggestions have been made that perhaps only 10 to 12 of the fleet of the 18 CP 140s may receive this major airframe overhaul. A recent decision to delay approval of the ASLEP until this autumn reinforces the lack of urgency felt for this project.

AFAC Position

• We support the avionics update of the Aurora, which will give it significant C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities needed for a variety of future missions. The Aurora will have modern capabilities to perform surveillance over land or water, command and control, and other demanding missions, in addition to its traditional anti-submarine capability. But even more, these enhanced capabilities will be invaluable in the conduct of many varied operations – at home and abroad – within the newly-formed joint operational commands. The CP 140 will be an invaluable asset for Joint Task Force commanders.
  
• Undue delay or compromise of the accompanying project for structural sustainment will have a disastrous effect on the CP140’s ability to conduct its assigned roles and tasks domestically and with our allies and partners. The ASLEP demands urgent attention and should be implemented to take advantage of the entire fleet of 18 aircraft.
• Reducing the current fleet size would draw numbers below the critical mass needed to operate off both coasts, and even marginal economies of scale would be difficult to achieve. Abandoning the West coast, for example, to ensure a working fleet remained in the East, would be illogical and inconsistent with the need to provide security of all of our borders. Reductions of the fleet would also put at risk the Governments’ re-emphasised requirement to patrol and survey our Northern regions, or have aircraft available for deployment abroad.
  
• The eventual procurement of the capabilities of UAVs or satellites, while effective force multipliers, are unlikely to be able to perform the full surveillance mission by themselves. Sovereignty is enhanced with surveillance that involves a manned presence to assert ownership, along with the ability to make on-the-spot judgements, and to collect the best information possible. Aurora aircraft enable this and represent a unique capability given the strategic distances involved.
  
• There is a real risk of squandering a capability that will be difficult and most expensive to recover if the Aurora fleet is limited in numbers or by structural life remaining.

Messages

· The Aurora maritime patrol aircraft represents a critical strategic capability which will continue to be needed on deployed operations, for domestic coastal surveillance, and for Northern operations. While other unmanned surveillance platforms may continue to evolve as important capabilities, they cannot offer the flexibility and on-scene presence that a manned aircraft can. Moreover the updated Aurora can provide important command and control capabilities not available otherwise.

· A significant investment is being made to modernize the Aurora avionics systems. It is logical and economically sound to ensure that the airframe is appropriately upgraded and maintained so as to fully exploit the resources invested in this important capability. It also makes sense to upgrade the avionics and structure of the entire fleet of 18 aircraft.

· It is strongly recommended, therefore, that the Aurora Service Life Extension Program (ASLEP) be fully funded, that it proceed as soon as possible, and that it be implemented on all aircraft.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee, with initiation and cooperation from the Pacific Group

Contacts: Terry Chester, tchester@shaw.ca, (250) 339-2413

SEE THE MINISTER’S RESPONSE

AFAC POSITION PAPER 02/2006

Background

· On retirement from the Canadian Forces, many members are given the opportunity to transfer to the Supplementary Reserve (Supp Res), thus indicating their willingness to consider further service if their skills and experience can be effectively employed. Few are ever contacted, despite an apparent need and the availability of valuable expertise, much of it still current. For those who are engaged, they become Primary Reservists for the length of time they are needed.

· The Supp Res must clearly be structured so as to respond to the needs of the CF. A well-manned, well-equipped and utilized Primary Reserve may well fill most needs, but a viable Supp Res can be a potential resource for unexpected contingencies.

· The state of the Supp Res, which replaced the somewhat cumbersome combination of the Supplementary Holding List and the Supplementary Ready Reserve, has become something of an embarrassment. The Supp Res, in its current form, is of extremely limited value. DND has not kept the list up to date and has made little effort to ensure the availability or operational currency of those with skill sets in demand. Those on the list have come to perceive their involvement with disappointment, after having made the effort to respond positively to an appeal to join.

· Many members of the AFAC belong or have belonged to the Supp Res. Their stories are consistent – they were never contacted to do anything, have little understanding of how the Supp Res is managed, and don’t expect to be asked to do anything. Many regret that their participation was not valued and that they were unable to make a contribution after their military service ended. In many cases, this lack of connectivity has resulted in retirees’ expectations being unrealistically high.

· The regulations concerning the Supp Res are not well understood. For example, according to DAOD 5002-4, Supp Res members are responsible for advising DPGP (Director General Personnel Generation Policy) of changes to personal circumstances, including change of address, employment and medical information, which may affect retention in the Supp Res. No instruction is provided, however, on how to do this. Rather, the DAOD is focused on internal management and administration of Supp Res members when called to service.

· A member who elects to be on the Supp Res will be on the list for 10 years following the date of release or until they reach 65. Just prior to the end of the 10-year period, DMHRR (Directorate of Military Human Resource Requirements) tries to send out letters to advise members that they will be removed from the list unless they can show that they have kept up their qualifications. If they do so, continuation is for five years at a time.

· In the past few years, the Supp Res list has been honed down to about 32,000 names. During a recent check, about 275 of these were being considered to fill positions where they were needed. This is a difficult process, however, with some real impediments:

o A recent CANFORGEN (181/05) clearly spells out that everyone, including Reservists from the Supplementary list must be deployable to be employable, that is, they must meet the full medical standard.

o There is no protection of civilian jobs for the period of Reserve service. This is not new but continues to be an issue for some.

o Maintaining qualifications may prove difficult for some without the benefit of refresher training

o Meeting the physical fitness standards may not be realistic.

AFAC Position

· It is recognized that older, retired, former CF members are not capable of fulfilling some military tasks normally done by younger, more fit personnel. That’s one of the reasons they retired in the first place. Additionally, it may not be convenient or practical for many to return to military service – because of other obligations, lack of currency of pertinent skills, etc.

· Having said this, the Supp Res contains a vast pool of experience and expertise that can be applied to good advantage to alleviate pressure on the Regular Force. Except for very unique circumstances, it may not be practical to train or re-qualify individuals to what might be considered ‘full military status’. Rather, Supp Res personnel can be more effectively employed in support positions or as replacement personnel where manning is short.

· The Supp Res member can fill staff positions, leaving the operational tasks for the full-time personnel. They can fulfil the more routine roles or perform the more-contained, or simpler, tasks to alleviate pressure from those directly engaged operationally. They can liberate an operational CF member for deployment.

· There should be no obligation to meet the standard CF medical, physical fitness or bilingualism requirements. As long as the Supp Reservist can meet the requirements of the specific job for which they are re-engaged, they can and should be employable for that purpose.

· One of the additional impediments, in the interests of treating everyone equally, might be a perceived requirement to pay Supp Reservists the same as other Reservists. Given their restricted employment and limited qualifications, this should be addressed so as to remunerate Supp Res personnel fairly, but without an expectation of equity.

· Overall, Supp Reservists should be considered a special category of reservist, perhaps with a unique designation, especially considering that many are already beyond CRA.

· Administration of the Supp Res cadre is clearly a challenge, perhaps because it has been allowed to grow out of control. If more frequent contact was made with those listed, a more accurate inventory of their qualifications and availability could be made. Those who joined the Supp Res for sentimental reasons only, or simply because it was easy to do, but have no real interest in ever serving, could be weeded out. Additionally, if a requirement for their skills is considered minimal, they should not artificially be kept on the list. This would increase confidence in the availability of the remaining core list of people.

· Overall, there should be real opportunities for Supp Res personnel to fulfill useful roles to relieve pressure during manning shortages, allowing front-line personnel to focus on their primary role of conducting and supporting operations. The Supp Res should, however, be managed more aggressively to reduce it to those who really are available and have skills which might be needed.

Messages

· Those who have retired from military service have skill sets and represent a vast pool of experience which can, from time to time, be employed to reduce pressure on other CF members focused on operations.

· Supplementary Reserve personnel are not the same as other Regular and Reserve members and should not be treated as such. They can contribute without meeting all the medical and physical standards as long as they have the qualifications to perform the work for which they are needed. Perhaps they should be designated differently from Primary Reservists to avoid any confusion.

· The Supp Res list needs to be managed more actively to thin it down to those who might at some point be able to make a meaningful and valued contribution – and are serious about making themselves available. These core members should be contacted regularly whereas others should be taken off the list.

· The Supp Res represents a ‘target rich’ source of military expertise which should not be ignored. They can perform support roles, fill staff positions, conduct training, etc, when others are not available. They can be employed without obligation, within well-defined terms of reference, and with the knowledge that they will perform their role professionally and competently in support of the CF.

· The Air Force Association of Canada encourages DND to take a more aggressive role in managing the Supplementary Reserve to meet CF requirements, and develop the necessary policies to enable them to serve when required, within specific guidelines and restrictions appropriate to their circumstances.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee

Point of Contact:
Primary — Don McLeod
Secondary — George Macdonald

AFAC POSITION PAPER 01/2006

Background

· Airlift – both tactical and strategic — is a critical capability. The ongoing need for it has been recently revalidated in current operations (particularly in Afghanistan), in the Defence Policy Statement, and in the CDS’s transformation vision.

· Problems associated with the employment of airlift assets have compounded in recent years due to declining availability, the need to regularly deploy tactical aircraft for extended periods, the ongoing high priority requirement to support search and rescue operations, and dependence on charter arrangements for most strategic cargo airlift. In addition to maintenance challenges, the ability to train new crews or upgrade the qualifications of others has been difficult.

· The Hercules tactical airlift fleet numbers 32 aircraft, 9 of which are relatively new H-model aircraft (5 H90 models with air-to-air refuelling capability, 2 H90 stretched models, and 2 H84s). The remaining 23 are older (19 E-models and 4 H73 models). Canada owns the worldwide high-time military aircraft and is now having to retire some because the viability and cost of supporting the older aircraft is becoming irreconcilable. As of Feb 06, two of the thirty-two aircraft have been retired. Projections call for an ongoing retirement rate of approximately 2 aircraft per year.

· The C-130E/H fleet is in crisis. It has become increasingly more difficult and expensive to operate and maintain – due to age and failing reliability. This prevailing condition is operationally and fiscally unacceptable.

· Generic strategic airlift is accomplished by ‘misemploying’ the Hercules and by the fleet of five Airbus A310 aircraft. While the latter are truly strategic, and have a passenger and/or cargo capability (in addition to two being fitted for air-to-air refuelling), they cannot handle outsize cargo or vehicles.

AFAC Position

· The vital Canadian tactical airlift capability must be addressed on an urgent basis to ensure that it will be sustained in the longer term. Canada needs this capability to enable the Canadian Forces to perform their mission. Overall, the serviceability of the Hercules fleet is not sufficient to properly support the current or anticipated needs of the CF. Corrective action needs to be taken on an urgent basis.

· Adequate funding must be made available to support and maintain the current fleet, recognizing that some aircraft are simply too old to continue to be flown. The long term solution has to be to replace the older aircraft – it is the most responsible and cost effective approach to the problem.

· It is recognized that recapitalization of the Hercules fleet has been unaffordable in the past, with budget limitations and other priorities. However, the situation has become so critical that a Hercules replacement project must be given top priority now.

· Relief for several of the Hercules can also be achieved through the introduction of a new Fixed Wing Search and Rescue aircraft, but this will only be a partial solution, in that many of the older aircraft will still need to be retained.

· While purchase of new aircraft is the desired approach, the requirement could be met through the lease of new aircraft if it is necessary to spread the cost over a larger number of years.

· While useful and sustainable, the A310 fleet is not adequate to meet Canada’s strategic airlift needs. A lasting solution needs to be found to ensure appropriate access to strategic airlift through purchase/lease and/or charter. Operation of strategic aircraft can contribute to offloading Hercules airlift taskings.

· Whatever the approach to the acquisition of new aircraft, the related Industrial and Regional Benefits package will be significant for Canadian industry. Additionally, the longer term support of the aircraft in Canada will create major industrial opportunities.

Messages

· Tactical and strategic airlift are critical Canadian Forces capabilities that will be needed for the indefinite future.

· The C130 Hercules tactical airlift fleet is experiencing considerable difficulty due to limited availability and reliability of the aircraft, increasing costs of maintaining older aircraft and risk in support to operations. This situation needs to be addressed aggressively now. Ensuring adequate repair and maintenance funding for the existing fleet is just a first step.

· The Canadian airlift capability needs to be addressed to develop a balanced air mobility solution. Consideration needs to be given to the provision of tactical and strategic airlift aircraft, along with a fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, in order to provide the most cost and operationally effective solution to the CF requirement. This can alleviate pressure on the current Hercules fleet and will enable the CF to deploy personnel and equipment rapidly over long distances, domestically or internationally.

· Addressing this situation presents an excellent opportunity for the Canadian Government to reinforce its support for the Canadian Forces by taking decisive action to address a well-known, longstanding deficiency.

· Action now will be good for Canadians, good for the CF, and will present opportunities for Canadian industry.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee

Point of Contact:

Marc Terreau, terreau@sympatico.ca, (613) 837-8746

SEE THE MINISTER’S RESPONSE