Canada’s Participation in Ballistic Missile Defence

AFAC POSITION PAPER 06/2006

Background

• Over the past few decades the United States has spent a huge amount of research and development dollars towards a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Moreover, in 1999 the US Government enacted legislation to field a system as soon as the technology became available to do so. As the reality of a viable capability neared, Canada and the US began discussions about the possibility of Canadian participation in the system as a part of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) partnership.
• Canadian representatives began in 2002 to pursue discussions with a view to reaching a positive decision on participation. Still lacking resolution of this and realizing the immanency of an initial operating capability, in August of 2004, the NORAD Agreement was amended to ensure that ballistic missile warning information provided by NORAD would continue to be a NORAD responsibility even though it would be used for BMD purposes. Such an amendment was needed to ensure that Canadians could maintain involvement in a traditional NORAD role.
• Despite positive signals that Canada would likely join the US in providing BMD for the continent, the Government announced in February of 2005 that it had chosen not to participate. This was a surprise to many, although the majority of Canadians appeared to support the Government’s decision, as arguments against BMD were many and were not effectively refuted. Some of the points made were as follows, along with a clarifying statement or counterpoint.
  • BMD won’t work – In reality, there were testing failures, but there were also successes, as there are in any complex development program.
  • BMD will precipitate nuclear proliferation – Unfortunately, nuclear proliferation is a reality — the issue is how to deal with it. In providing a defence against the so-called ‘rogue nation’ with a few weapons, BMD will help to mitigate the threat from proliferation. It would be stabilizing overall.
  • Deployment will lead to weapons in space – This is possible, but the system is not so designed. As a participant, Canada might have had some influence on issues related to the deployment of space-based weapons.
  • The system is too expensive, and a waste of money – Perhaps, but the US is funding it entirely.
  • There is no threat – And yet recent events in North Korea and Iran have demonstrated a continued commitment by those countries to develop nuclear weapons and a means to deliver them intercontinentally.
  • We don’t want missiles on Canadian soil – This was never part of the plan.
  • We don’t want nuclear fallout over Canada – While no nuclear weapons are used in BMD, there is a minimal risk of debris from an engagement falling on Canadian territory. For the most part, this would be burned up in the atmosphere.
• BMD is destabilizing by giving the US too much power – But it is better to defend against a small attack, rather than simply resorting to retaliation as a nuclear deterrent.
  •The failure to accept BMD as a NORAD mission has diminished the importance of the alliance to the Americans and the role that Canadian military members play in integrated operations. As time passes, the relevance of NORAD is being questioned more and more, especially with the formation of Northern Command in Colorado Springs and the priority being assigned to it.

AFAC Position

• NORAD has provided the means to detect, warn against, intercept and engage, if necessary, threats which penetrate continental airspace. That is, NORAD can detect and mount a modest defence against the traditional bomber or cruise missile threat. When it comes to ballistic missiles, however, NORAD’s capability has been limited to detecting and providing warning of an attack. It would be a logical extension of the NORAD mission to defend against this aerospace threat.
• Those who argue against BMD have not presented a case that stands up to a logical debate on the issue. If anything, detractors cite that Canada should not participate because it is a priority of the Bush Administration, even though President Clinton was in power when the legislation was passed.
• The Conservative Government has indicated a willingness to re-consider Canadian participation, and should be encouraged to do so. It has been stated, however, that this could be triggered by a request from the US for Canada to participate. Given the history of the discussions (which were initiated by Canada in the first instance), the unexpected announcement not to participate, and the fact that the US has proceeded independently to ‘operationalize’ the system, there is little chance that the US will make any request. Canada must take the initiative.
• The future of NORAD has been compromised by the BMD decision and Canada should take the initiative to address this situation if we wish to continue to benefit from this most unique partnership with the US.
  Messages
• The decision not to participate in BMD was not fully thought through. Notwithstanding the public support of the decision, logical examination of the issue demonstrates that it is in Canada’s interest to be involved in a security issue which affects the continent.
• Canada’s position in NORAD is atrophying, in large part due to the decision not to participate in BMD. Canada benefits significantly from an effective NORAD partnership, and should do everything to assure the well-being of a continuing partnership.
• The Government should reopen the BMD issue. Canada should take the initiative by requesting to open negotiations on participation. This should probably be done by the Prime Minister of Canada directly with the President of the United States.

Developed by: Aviation Affairs Committee
Point of Contact:
Dean Black, director@airforce.ca, 613-232-4281
Date: December 2006